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OK, GOOGLE,
WILL ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
REPLACE HUMAN LAWYERING?
MELISSA LOVE KOENIG, JULIE A. OSEID & AMY VORENBERG*
[O]nly humans can argue.
Argument is the affirmation of our being . . .
As a reasoned dialogue, it resolves disputes . . .
As a plea, it generates mercy.
As charismatic oration, it moves multitudes and changes
history.
We must argue—to help, to warn, to lead, to love, to create, to
learn, to enjoy justice—to be.
Gerry Spence, American Trial Lawyer1
Will Artificial Intelligence (AI) replace human lawyering? The answer is
no. Despite worries that AI is getting so sophisticated that it could take over
the profession, there is little cause for concern. Indeed, the surge of AI in the
legal field has crystalized the real essence of effective lawyering. The lawyer’s
craft goes beyond what AI can do because we listen with empathy to clients’
stories, strategize to find the story that might not be obvious, thoughtfully use
our imagination and judgment to decide which story will appeal to an audience,
and creatively tell those winning stories.
This Article reviews the current state of AI in legal practice and contrasts
that with the essence of exclusively human lawyering skills—empathy,
imagination, and creativity. As examples, we use three Supreme Court cases
to illustrate these skills.

* Melissa Love Koenig is an Associate Professor of Legal Writing at Marquette University Law
School. Julie A. Oseid is a Professor of Law and the Morrison Family Director of Lawyering Skills at
the University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis, Minnesota. Amy Vorenberg is a Professor
of Law and the Director of Legal Writing at the University of New Hampshire School of Law.
1. GERRY SPENCE, HOW TO ARGUE AND WIN EVERY TIME 5 (David Stanford Burr eds., 1995).
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I. INTRODUCTION
“Ok, Google, Will artificial intelligence replace human lawyering?” The
answer is no. Despite worries that artificial intelligence—or “AI” as it’s
commonly referred to—is getting so sophisticated that it could take over the
profession, there is little cause for concern.
Right now, computers are assisting lawyers with document discovery
review,2 and computer review is often more accurate than human review.3 But
AI isn’t stopping there. AI technology can research a particular legal issue by
reviewing thousands of cases and then delivering a ranked list of the most
relevant cases.4 It can also allow a person to pose a legal question and receive
a responsive two-page explanatory memo.5 But how far can AI go? Is it
possible that AI could actually research, formulate, AND advocate a particular
legal position?

2. Julia Voss & David J. Simmons, Technology-Assisted Review Makes Main Street, A.B.A.
LITIG. NEWS, Summer 2018, at 2 (technology-assisted review uses coding on a subset of documents to
“predict how an attorney would code the entire data set”). For a comprehensive discussion of the
technical and computational aspects of forging artificial intelligence onto legal research and reasoning,
see generally KEVIN D. ASHLEY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND LEGAL ANALYTICS: NEW TOOLS
FOR LAW PRACTICE IN THE DIGITAL AGE (2017).
3. Id. at 3 (it is a mistake to assume human review is “the gold standard” because humans are
often inconsistent).
4. Steve Lohr, A.I. Is Doing Legal Work. But It Won’t Replace Lawyers, Yet., N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
19, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/19/technology/lawyers-artificial-intelligence.html
[https://perma.cc/5RVJ-ZN8C]; see also Jill Lepore, Are Robots Competing For Your Job?, NEW
YORKER (Feb. 25, 2019), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/03/04/are-robots-competingfor-your-job [https://perma.cc/9WQ5-L36E].
5. Lohr, supra note 4.
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Probably not. Indeed, the surge of AI in the legal field has crystalized the
real essence of effective lawyering. As lawyers, our future depends on those
very human qualities that, as of now, cannot be replaced with AI. The lawyer’s
“craft” goes beyond what AI can do because we listen with empathy to clients’
stories, strategize to find the story that might not be obvious, thoughtfully use
our imagination and judgment to decide which story will appeal to an audience,
and creatively tell those winning stories.6 We call this craft “artisanal” because
it evokes the hands-on, traditional skill of lawyering.
This Article reviews the current state of AI in legal practice and contrasts
that with what we believe defines the essence of lawyering—empathy,
storytelling, and creativity. As examples, we use three Supreme Court cases to
illustrate these exclusively human skills. Admittedly, our information will
likely be out-of-date as soon as we finalize this Article.7 Still, we think it is
6. This Article focuses on the lawyer’s role in persuasion. Others have pointed out that
sophisticated processes, like blockchain, “‘couldn’t possibly render legal professionals irrelevant’ and
certainly will not eliminate the valued counseling services that [lawyers] typically render.” Daniel S.
Wittenberg, Blockchain: Technology Rockin’ the Legal Industry, A.B.A. LITIG. NEWS, Summer 2018,
at 27 (quoting David Fisher, founder and chief executive officer of Integra Leger).
7. Even as we finish the draft of this Article, the most recent edition of the ABA’s Litigation
News magazine has two articles on the use of artificial intelligence. See Voss & Simmons, supra note
2; Wittenberg, supra note 6. The Wall Street Journal ran a series on artificial intelligence on April 2,
2019, discussing AI’s emergence and uses in various job markets and in the home. Some of the articles
described concerns humans have about interacting with AI or being replaced by AI. E.g., John
McCormick, What AI Can Tell From Listening to You, WALL STREET J., Apr. 2, 2109, at R1–R2
(stating that current surveys indicate people are uncomfortable with “emotion AI”); Carl Benedikt
Frey, Will AI Destroy More Jobs Than It Creates Over the Next Decade? YES, WALL STREET J., Apr.
2, 2019, at R4 (referring to his research with Michael Osborne that indicates “47% of U.S. jobs could
be automated due to AI”). A common theme among these articles, however, was that in handling
routine and mundane functions, AI has the potential to free humans to handle more complicated or
nuanced decisions and collaborations. E.g., Robert D. Atkinson, Will AI Destroy More Jobs Than It
Creates Over the Next Decade? NO, WALL STREET J., Apr. 2, 2019, at R4 (arguing that it would be
“incredibly difficult” to automate certain jobs—such as a doctor’s role—and emphasizing that AI
complements what humans can do); Asa Fitch, The Next Big Hurdle for AI: A Card Game, WALL
STREET J., Apr. 2, 2019, at R5 (noting that currently “where AI stumbles is in cracking some of the
seemingly simple games, the ones that require an ability to communicate and collaborate”); Alexandra
Samuel, Meet Echo, My New Co-Parent, WALL STREET J., Apr. 2, 2019, at R7 (describing the ways
the Amazon Echo helps the author to be a better parent by remedying forgetfulness in parenting tasks);
Jim Carlton, As the Threat of Wildfires Grows, AI can Help Battle the Blazes, WALL STREET J., Apr.
2, 2019, at R7 (quoting Edward Smith, a Nature Conservancy forest ecology and fire manager, as
saying, ‘“Nothing is going to completely replace the human brain to make decisions, but AI can help
us make better decisions across a much larger area,’”); Thomas W. Malone, What AI Will Do to
Corporate Hierarchies, WALL STREET J., Apr. 2, 2019, at R6 (arguing that AI will produce less-rigid
hierarchies in corporations because “when AI does the routine tasks, much of the remaining nonroutine
work is likely to be done in loose ‘adhocracies,’ ever-shifting groups of people with the combinations
of skills needed for whatever problems arise”); Aili McConnon, Virtual Simulations Offer a Cure for
Doctors’ Poor Bedside Manner, WALL STREET J., Apr. 2, 2019, at R6 (describing AI simulations that
teach those in the medical profession to improve the way they respond to patients).
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important to take stock of AI’s current role in the law even as we acknowledge
that it will continue to change, improve, and perhaps one day be capable of the
empathy that we posit is a uniquely human capacity. As long as human beings,
especially judges, are making the ultimate decisions in law, there will be a role
for the human lawyer.
To argue, as we do here, that AI does not have feelings (and therefore will
not overtake lawyering) is a pretty self-evident proposition. Instead, we focus
on describing what it actually means to have and use feelings as a lawyer.
Empathy and storytelling—both core human characteristics—are essential to
lawyering and advocacy and, at least for the foreseeable future, cannot be
mastered by AI.
II. ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
While AI in the context of lawyers might bring to mind images of R2D2
dressed like The Good Wife’s Alicia Florrick, delivering a perfectly executed
closing argument, the truth is that AI’s usefulness in legal advocacy is limited,
at least for now. AI refers to computerized language processing or machine
learning that allows a computer system to perform human-like tasks.8
Currently, AI’s usefulness in law exists in content management (creating and
storing documents) and practice management (operations that run a legal
services organization or business).9 The technology promises to reduce
redundancies and inefficiencies.10
Examples of companies offering AI legal platforms include Neota Logic—
a company advertising a platform that “connects complex content and expert
analysis to provide precise, immediate answers and automate repetitive
knowledge work.”11 ThinkSmart is a workflow automation platform that offers
to “quickly and easily automate any mundane business process.”12

8. JOANNA GOODMAN, ROBOTS ON LAW: HOW ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE IS TRANSFORMING
LEGAL SERVICES 4–5 (2016).
9. Id. at 9.
10. Legal Project Management, SEYFARTH SHAW LLP, https://www.seyfarth.com/legal-projectmanagement [https://perma.cc/S869-CRYF] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019) (stating that the company’s
services include “legal project management” that “create efficient and cost effective solutions via
project planning, client management, process improvement and unique client and legal service delivery
solutions”).
LOGIC,
11. Expertise
Automation
for
Law
Firms,
NEOTA
https://www.neotalogic.com/industry/law-firms/ [https://perma.cc/484H-5XXB] (last visited Jan. 26,
2019).
12. MEET TAP: ThinkSmart’s Workflow Automation Platform, THINKSMART,
https://thinksmart.com/workflow-automation-platform/ [https://perma.cc/WF6X-2WEH] (last visited
Jan. 26, 2019).
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LegalZoom and Rocketlawyer, both marketed as companies that can
simplify your legal needs, offer platforms for filling out legal documents and
self-guided solutions to everyday legal issues like uncontested divorce,
immigration status, and landlord–tenant issues.13 Some of the technology
actually replaces real lawyers with robots. DoNotPay, a chatbot program
created by a non-lawyer university student, uses robot lawyers to help users
successfully challenge parking tickets.14 The company is expanding to provide
robot lawyers or “bots” that can help homeless people get public housing or
help asylum seekers apply for refugee status in the UK.15 Elexirr, a similar
program, can “calculate[] a user’s chance of success in winning a legal claim
with 71% accuracy and refers them to a network of law firms best suited to deal
with their claim.”16
Ross Intelligence, a legal research platform powered by IBM’s Watson
technology, is being advertised as “the world’s first artificially intelligent
attorney.”17 The Ross robot lawyer can take a legal issue and pump out an
answer and explanation the next day.18 Thus far, the Ross program can sift
through thousands of cases and find and rank those cases most relevant to the
new situation.19 One lawyer reported that he tested Ross only to discover that
its search/rank feature found the most relevant case almost instantly while it
took him ten hours to find it on his own.20
Dive into any of the websites of these companies and you won’t find
anything about how these systems can strategize, craft, and draft legal

13. LEGALZOOM, https://www.legalzoom.com/ [https://perma.cc/A2QH-TGT2] (last visited
Jan. 26, 2019); ROCKETLAWYER, https://www.rocketlawyer.com/ [https://perma.cc/9TR8-B27A] (last
visited Jan. 26, 2019).
14. DONOTPAY, https://www.donotpay.com/ [https://perma.cc/68YJ-NQSL] (type in a query
about fighting a New York City Parking ticket related to signage and you get this: “Welcome. I am a
bot to help you appeal a ticket in New York when there was no clear signage. Firstly, what is your
ticket number?”).
15. GOODMAN, supra note 8, at 48.
LEGAL
GEEK,
https://www.legalgeek.co/startup-map-v1/elexirr/
16. Elexirr,
[https://perma.cc/NBP3-FZ8S] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
17. Karen Turner, Meet ‘Ross,’ The Newly Hired Legal Robot, WASH. POST (May 16, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/innovations/wp/2016/05/16/meet-ross-the-newly-hired-legalrobot/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.6158a62aad9c [https://perma.cc/6P7Q-65LG].
18. Lohr, supra note 4. Judicata also advertises a system called Clerk, described as “moneyball
for motions.” Jean O’Grady, Forget the Robots You Might Just Need A Clerk. Judicata’s Clerk:
Algorithms and Analytics That “Grade” and Recommends Edits to Briefs, DEWY B STRATEGIC (Nov.
10, 2017), https://www.deweybstrategic.com/2017/11/judicata-clerk.html [https://perma.cc/Q5RCBT8N]. The system allows lawyers to input briefs and get back a grade that evaluates argument,
drafting, context, and more. Id.
19. Lohr, supra note 4.
20. Id.
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arguments. That is because the technology is not capable of doing the creative,
flexible analysis that legal argument requires.21 At least for now, automated
lawyering skills are limited to those tasks that have an underlying pattern or
structure susceptible to being turned into instructions that a computer can
process.22 As a recent New York Times headline proclaimed, “A.I. is Doing
Legal Work. But It Won’t Replace Lawyers, Yet.”23
The reason for this is obvious. Empathy is at the root of the uniquely
powerful human ability to hear a story or observe an incident and react
appropriately—to immediately assess the incident’s essential elements,
categorize it as a member of a particular class of legal problems, compare the
elements to analogous cases we remember, and decide on how best to proceed.
Lawyers go through this process without a second thought, and it’s only when
one stops and thinks how to get a machine to duplicate such a cascade of
understanding, analysis, distillation, and analogizing that the complexity of
human cognition stands out. While parts of this process may eventually get
broken down into tasks AI can assist with, developing the ability to understand
the relationships, emotions, facts, precedents, contingencies, and necessary
decisions present in even the simplest client interview or legal strategy meeting
is beyond AI’s current horizon. In short, the nuanced and critical lawyering
skills needed to form persuasive arguments are not likely to be susceptible to
computerization.
III. THE LAWYER AS ARTISAN: STORY FINDING AND STORYTELLING
An artisan is “a person skilled in an applied art; a craftsperson”24 who
provides high-quality products. 25 Lawyers are artisans, too. And one of our
21. Dana Remus & Frank Levy, Can Robots Be Lawyers? Computers, Lawyers, and the Practice
of Law, 30 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 501, 519 (2017). But see Meredith Somers, Emotion AI, Explained,
MIT SLOAN SCH. MGMT. (Mar. 8, 2019), https://mitsloan.mit.edu/ideas-made-to-matter/emotion-aiexplained [https://perma.cc/4FKH-BAHY].
22. Remus & Levy, supra note 21, at 508–09.
23. Lohr, supra note 4.
24. Artisan, WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (2d College ed. 2000).
25. Artisan products “reflect high-quality craftsmanship and care.” Lisa Goller, Artisan Sales
(Aug.
8,
2017),
Soar
as
Consumers
Invest
in
Quality,
RANGEME
https://www.rangeme.com/blog/artisan-sales-soar-as-consumers-invest-in-quality
[https://perma.cc/X3ZN-EWUL] (“From beer to beauty, artisan products—goods made in small
batches to reflect high-quality craftsmanship and care—are extremely popular among consumers right
now. Unlike mainstream and mass-produced products, artisan products represent unique, affordable
luxuries made with mastery.”). An artisan explosion has swept through the United States in the last
decade. See Janet Helm, Food Trend Alert: Artisan is the New Quality, NUTRITION UNPLUGGED (Oct.
23, 2010), https://www.nutritionunplugged.com/2010/10/food-trend-alert-artisan-is-the-new-quality/
[https://perma.cc/DL65-Z5FX]. Travel guides help visitors locate the best artisan food places. See,
e.g., Katie Sweeney, 5 Places to Sample San Francisco’s Artisan Explosion, FORBES TRAVEL GUIDE
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essential lawyering crafts is storytelling, which fuses empathy and creative
flexible analysis. After all, “Legal stories, though nonfiction, are still stories.”26
This—the space where human experience is critical—is where lawyers can still
outperform AI.27 AI draws only on what it has been trained to do—sort through
huge databases and even “incrementally solv[e] problems”28—but “the human
condition is expansive and broad and brings a lot more depth of
perspective . . . .”29 Storytelling is an artisanal activity because each legal story
is handcrafted and tailored to persuade a judge, jury, or even the opposing party.

(Mar. 26, 2015), http://stories.forbestravelguide.com/5-places-to-sample-san-franciscos-artisanexplosion [https://perma.cc/A743-AA7G] (“These [small street stores] are stocking shelves with
high-end local cheeses, baked goods, charcuterie, unique wines from all over the world, and
housemade lamb salads and braised chicken legs with white wine, apples and
onions.”). Artisan fabric is a popular style in fashion. Olivia Fleming, The Artisan Fabric Is
BAZAAR
(Aug.
12,
2016),
Revolutionizing
the
Fashion
Industry,
HARPER’S
https://www.harpersbazaar.com/culture/features/a17111/piece-and-co-handmade-artisan-fabricrevolutionizing-fashion-industry/ [https://perma.cc/G63B-ERXS]. Artisan aesthetic was HGTV’s top
home design trend for 2018. Irma Zandl, Artisan Aesthetic: HGTV’s Top Home Design Trend for 2018,
OPINIONATOR (Nov. 4, 2017), http://theopinionator.com/artisan-aesthetic-top-home-design-trend-for2018/ [https://perma.cc/X587-2EXC].
26. RUTH ANNE ROBBINS, STEVE JOHANSEN & KEN CHESTEK, YOUR CLIENT’S STORY:
PERSUASIVE LEGAL WRITING 44 (2013).
27. Research into training computers to replicate story arcs has already begun. Adrienne
Lafrance, The Six Main Arcs in Storytelling, As Identified by an A.I., POCKET (July 12, 2016),
https://getpocket.com/explore/item/the-six-main-arcs-in-storytelling-as-identified-by-an-a-i
[https://perma.cc/SK5L-ETXU]. But identifying a story arc, while useful, is a far less complex skill
than analyzing how a law applies to a set of facts (a human story) to determine a strategy and argument,
then packaging that argument into a compelling narrative. Researchers have also been developing
ways to create storylines that appear as fake news, with results so disturbingly realistic that the
researchers did not launch the program with its full potential. Sean Gallagher, Researchers Scared by
Their Own Work, Hold Back “Deepfakes for Text” AI, ARS TECHNICA (Feb. 15, 2019, 2:10 PM),
https://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2019/02/researchers-scared-by-their-own-work-holdback-deepfakes-for-text-ai/ [https://perma.cc/2GQ5-QQK3]; see also Alex Hern, New AI Fake Text
Generator may Be too Dangerous to Release, Says Creators, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 14, 2019, 12:00
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2019/feb/14/elon-musk-backed-ai-writes-convincingnews-fiction [https://perma.cc/3FGZ-YDHL] (discussing ‘“deepfakes for text,’” in research that has
been backed by Elon Musk and others). Again, however, the ability to create a storyline is not the
same as the ability to see what is compelling in a story and to harness that narrative into a legal
argument.
28. Tim Wallace, Robot, Waiter, Artisan Baker: Three New Classes of Worker for the Digital
Age, TELEGRAPH (June 12, 2018, 9:12 PM), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2018/06/12/robotwaiter-artisan-baker-three-new-classes-worker-digital/ [https://perma.cc/C3JQ-KYCD].
29. Tierney Bonini & Paul Donoughue, Artificial Intelligence and Creativity: If Robots Can
Make Art, What’s Left for Us?, ABC NEWS (Aug. 10, 2017, 8:50 PM),
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-08-11/artificial-intelligence-can-ai-be-creative/8793906
[https://perma.cc/P6HK-YAUX] (quoting Dave King, founder of Move 37, a creative AI company).
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Lawyers make “great logical leaps of imagination”30 when they listen
closely to a client’s story, reflect on both the obvious and hidden stories, and
then persuasively tell those stories. Storytelling is, of course, not only a
lawyer’s ability, but also a human ability. The human practice of storytelling
is ancient31 and universal.32 Michelle Scalise Sugiyama paints a vivid picture
of the robust power of story:
Literate or not, all known cultures, past and present, practice
storytelling. Moreover, all normally developing humans
acquire the ability to process and generate stories . . . . [N]o
special education is required for narrative competence to
develop[;] . . . the practice of storytelling itself arises
independently among even the most isolated people[].33
Storytelling takes the same basic form in all cultures;34 “stories describe
problems and [a] character[’s] plans [to] solv[e them.]”35
30. Wallace, supra note 28. Andy Haldane, the Bank of England’s chief economist, emphasized
that human creativity and intuition is needed for “tasks or problems whose solutions require great
logical leaps of imagination rather than step-by-step hill climbing.” Id. The great storyteller Ian
McEwan recently published Machines Like Me, a novel in which the main character, Charlie, purchases
an artificial human. Elizabeth Winkler, Ian McEwan: A Novelist Ponders Our AI Future, WALL
STREET J., Apr. 13, 2019, at C17 (describing the novel). In his interview with the Wall Street Journal
about the novel, McEwan cautioned about the “irresistible” desire to “’anthropomorphiz[e] a halfwayintelligent machine, as long as it gestures and looks like us.’” Id.; see also Timothy Lau, Presentation
at Duquense University School of Law: Artificial Intelligence: Thinking About Law, Law Practice,
and Legal Education (Apr. 26, 2019) (stating that “excessive anthropomorphism of AI is risky”). To
the extent that humans fear AI, and specifically fear that AI will eliminate jobs, we think humans are
anthropomorphizing AI’s capabilities, and from there, leaping to the not-necessarily-true inference that
AI will therefore replace human capability.
31. Michelle Scalise Sugiyama, Narrative Theory and Function: Why Evolution Matters, 25
PHIL. & LITERATURE 233, 233 (2001). The practice of storytelling “pre-dat[es] not only the advent of
writing, but of agriculture and permanent settlement as well.” Id. Language likely developed
approximately 100,000 years ago. Id.; see also GEOFFREY MILLER, THE MATING MIND 260 (2000)
(adding that this is the time when Homo sapiens began migrating out of Africa). The earliest known
written narrative is about 5,000 years old, but oral narratives likely emerged between 30,000 and
100,000 years ago. Sugiyama, supra note 31, at 233–34.
32. Story is partly universal because language is uniquely able to capture both simple and
complex information: “All human languages are thought to possess the same general structure and
permit an almost limitless production of information for communication. This limitlessness has been
described as ‘making infinite use of finite means.’” Martin A. Nowak & David C. Krakauer, The
Evolution of Language, 96 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. USA 8028, 8028 (1999).
33. Sugiyama, supra note 31, at 234.
34. Id. at 234. Stories include “character, . . . goal-oriented action, and resolution.” Id.; see also
ROBBINS, JOHANSEN & CHESTEK, supra note 26, at 38 (stating a story is “[a] character-based and
descriptive telling of a character’s efforts, over time, to overcome obstacles and achieve a goal”).
35. John B. Black & Gordon H. Bower, Story Understanding as Problem-Solving, 9 POETICS
223, 231 (1980); see also Ruth Ann Robbins, Harry Potter, Ruby Slippers and Merlin: Telling the
Client’s Story Using the Characters and Paradigm of the Archetypal Hero’s Journey, 29 SEATTLE U.
L. REV. 767, 768–69 (2006) [hereinafter, Robbins, Harry Potter].
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Legal storytelling evolved from the foundational principles of classical
Classical
rhetoric—“the use of language for persuasive purposes.”36
rhetoricians emphasized the importance of three types of arguments: ethos
(argument based on the author or speaker’s credibility), pathos (arguments
based on emotion), and logos (arguments based on logic) in persuasion.37 All
three types of argument are important and intertwined.38 And a story is the best
way to make all three types of arguments.
At first glance, it may seem like AI would be more successful and efficient
than a human lawyer at all three rhetoric components. Won’t AI be best able
to find all the applicable logical arguments? Won’t AI avoid all emotion and
instead present only logical arguments? Won’t AI have ethos because judges
will see it as incapable of misrepresentation and thus inherently reliable? A
closer look reveals that lawyers, not AI, have the edge in making all three types
of arguments.
In law, logical arguments require much more than an application of legal
rules to a set of uncontested facts. The reality is that “there may not be a right
answer to every legal question.”39 This is why two different Circuit Courts of
Appeals can reach two different conclusions about how the same law should be
interpreted and why many United States Supreme Court cases have a majority
opinion and a dissent—and often several concurring opinions. Frankly, this is
why lawyers have jobs.
There is much uncertainty in the law, and judges must decide “knotty
questions . . . in a context in which there’s usually profound disagreement about
both what has happened and what ought to be done about it.”40 “Malleability,”
or “the latitude a lawyer has in articulating legal principles,” is at the heart of

36. EDWARD P. J. CORBETT & ROBERT J. CONNORS, CLASSICAL RHETORIC FOR THE MODERN
STUDENT 15 (4th ed. 1999). Corbett and Connors further explain:
Classical rhetoric was associated primarily with persuasive discourse. Its end
was to convince or persuade an audience to think in a certain way or to act in a
certain way. Later, the principles of rhetoric were extended to apply to
informative or expository modes of discourse, but in the beginning, they were
applied almost exclusively to the persuasive modes of discourse.
Id. at 16.
37. MICHAEL H. FROST, INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC: A LOST HERITAGE
5 (2005).
38. Michael H. Frost, With Amici Like These: Cicero, Quintilian and the Importance of Stylistic
Demeanor, 3 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 5, 9 (2006).
39. Linda Ross Meyer, When Reasonable Minds Differ, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1467, 1468 (1996).
40. Maksymilian Del Mar, The Legal Imagination, AEON (Mar. 28, 2017),
https://aeon.co/essays/why-judges-and-lawyers-need-imagination-as-much-as-rationality
[https://perma.cc/3TGC-YWR9] (Del Mar is a reader in legal theory at the School of Law at Queen
Mary University of London).
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legal practice.41 It is the malleability of the law, within reason, that allows a
lawyer to argue different interpretations of legal principles, point out that a
precedent case should be interpreted narrowly or broadly, emphasize that a
policy argument controls, or suggest that a judge should not follow an outdated
precedent. And every single one of these tasks requires a human lawyer to use
his or her imagination, which is why an argument is a hand-crafted,
individualized art form.
Legal reasoning is impossible without human imagination.42 We imagine
hypotheticals because we know that judges will test how our proposed legal
interpretation will apply to new situations. We imagine metaphors to help us
understand and make sense of difficult legal concepts.43 We imagine
relationships when none technically exists. We imagine how considerations
outside of the law impact the law itself.
Most importantly, we imagine what it would be like to be in another
person’s shoes. It is the uniquely human quality of empathy that allows one
person to identify with, or vicariously experience the feelings and thoughts of,
another person.44 From the time stories developed, “[t]he storyteller takes what
he tells from experience—his own or that reported by others. And he in turn
makes it the experience of those who are listening to his tale.”45 Because the
logic in the law is tied not just to legal principles, but also to facts, a human
lawyer has the edge on logos. Pure deductive reasoning relies on syllogisms
based on absolute facts. But legal cases do not present absolute facts. The facts
of a case are necessarily complex, tangled, unknown. An analogy, where a
lawyer compares the story of one case to another, allows an advocate to address
the complexities of messy human facts.
41. Melissa H. Weresh, Stargate: Malleability as a Threshold Concept in Legal Education, 63 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 689, 710–11 (2014) (arguing that malleability is thus the threshold concept that law
students must understand to become professionals).
42. Del Mar, supra note 40 (“Legal reasoning has at least four imaginative abilities at its
disposal”—supposing, relations, image-making, and “the ability to take on the perspectives of other
people.”).
43. Linda H. Edwards, Once Upon a Time in Law: Myth, Metaphor, and Authority, 77 TENN. L.
REV. 883, 889 (2010); Julie A. Oseid, The Power of Metaphor: Thomas Jefferson’s “Wall of
Separation Between Church and State,” 7 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRECTORS 123, 123 (2010);
Michael R. Smith, Levels of Metaphor in Persuasive Legal Writing, 58 MERCER L. REV. 919, 923
(2007).
44. Empathy, WEBSTER’S AMERICAN DICTIONARY (2d College ed. 2000). A similar point has
been made in Deep Medicine, in which author and physician Eric Topol argues that bringing AI into
medicine allows medical practitioners to focus on the “essential human element of medical practice.”
ERIC TOPOL, DEEP MEDICINE 15 (2019). To that end, Topol identifies the importance of empathy in
medicine and argues that AI can facilitate a medical practitioner’s ability to empathize and connect
with patients. See id. at 17.
45. WALTER BENJAMIN, ILLUMINATIONS 31 (Hannah Arendt ed., 1st Mariner Books ed. 2019).
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Ethos, too, is more effective in human lawyering than in AI.46 An
advocate’s credibility “is an aura formed by an advocate’s entire professional
life—before he or she ever sets foot in the Court—by the tone and context of
the briefs, by what happens in Court that day, and by the residual impact of
previous presentations.”47 No lawyer ever wants to lose that credibility.48 A
persuasive advocate is the lawyer the Court knows it can rely on. A lawyer
who has honed that reputation during years of service will have more ethos than
AI.
Humans are the clear winners in the pathos category because AI is not yet
capable of human emotion. One expert on AI recently noted:
AI technologies are developing fast and so are their attendant
risks. AI applied to warfare and policing is certainly a concern.
Autonomous armed robots, which can track and target people
using facial recognition software, are just around the corner.
Let loose, such machines would keep on killing until they ran
out of targets or ammunition. This reminds us that AI has no
social awareness, conscience, mercy, or remorse. It simply
does what it’s been trained to do.49
Human lawyers have those listed intangibles of conscience, experience,
flexibility, and mercy. In finding and telling their client’s stories, lawyers
outshine AI.
IV. EMPATHY AND STORYTELLING IN THREE SUPREME COURT CASES
Three cases illustrate these human talents. The lawyers—all who went on
to become United States Supreme Court Justices—used creativity, empathy,
and judgment to persuade. Only a human being with curiosity and imagination
could find and develop these stories. Thurgood Marshall redefined the
segregation issue in Brown v. Board of Education as a story of personal,
fundamental injustice by successfully arguing that it wasn’t just bad schools,
46. The quality of being intelligent, prepared, and thorough is an important part of the author’s
credibility and character. Quintilian believed “the perfect orator is a good man speaking well.” FROST,
INTRODUCTION TO CLASSICAL LEGAL RHETORIC, supra note 37, at 69 (citing 2 Quintilian, INSTITUTIO
ORATORIA 9).
47. Theodore B. Olson, Ten Important Considerations for Supreme Court Advocacy, A.B.A.
LITIG. NEWS, Winter 2018, at 12, 14. Olson continued, “The advocate’s integrity, veracity, credibility,
and character are foundational elements of every argument.” Id. at 14.
48. Theodore B. Olson, a veteran Supreme Court advocate, recalls that Supreme Court Justice
Clarence Thomas’s words about ethos are etched in his memory, “[n]ever lose your credibility with
this Court.” Id. at 12.
49. Steven Finlay, We Should Be as Scared of Artificial Intelligence as Elon Musk Is, FORTUNE
(Aug.
18,
2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/08/18/elon-musk-artificial-intelligence-risk/
[https://perma.cc/7HP3-NNBM] (stating that Elon Musk commented on Twitter that “artificial
intelligence . . . is more dangerous than North Korea”).
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but a much bigger claim of inherent human damage. In Frontiero v.
Richardson, Ruth Bader Ginsburg tapped into her own experience with gender
discrimination to impart a convincing story of unfair struggle that persuaded
the Court to see working women in a new way. Ginsburg had the ingenuity to
know that one way to win her argument was to show that both women and men
would suffer without a change in the law. John Roberts used curiosity and
creativity to form a story where one was not obvious in Alaska v. EPA. These
three examples show the limits of AI and, perhaps more importantly, offer hope
for the future of human lawyering.
A. Brown v. Board of Education: Thurgood Marshall Tells A Story that
Ended a Fifty-Year Precedent
The 1954 Brown v. Board of Education school desegregation decision is
perhaps the best-known Supreme Court case. It has been studied, written about,
included in school curricula, and made into movies. Coming as it did at the
dawn of the television age, the resulting desegregation, with its footage of black
school children being ushered to school by police while angry mobs screamed
insults, has become a visual icon of the early civil rights movement.
Perhaps less commonly known is the extent to which this pivotal, historychanging case relied on an imaginative and novel legal strategy. In each of the
five consolidated cases that led to Brown, the records, the arguments, and
ultimately the Court’s decision referenced black children’s feelings of
insecurity and inferiority caused by segregation as a justification for
overturning a practice that had been ingrained in the country’s socio-economic
fiber for fifty years.50 By fashioning a narrative that interwove emotion and
logic, Thurgood Marshall and his team of NAACP lawyers pioneered a
groundbreaking, and ultimately successful, approach to advocacy.
Marshall’s personal experience in Baltimore provided the foundation for
the narrative he ultimately used to challenge the status quo. He went to a
segregated elementary school in Baltimore and experienced the profound
differences between the newer school the white children attended and his own,
with its lack of a playground and hand-me-down books.51 When Marshall
began high school in 1921, his school was the only one in Baltimore City and
was so overcrowded that the students attended in shifts.52 After attending
50. Brief for Appellants at 8–9, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1), 1952 WL
47265 at 5.
51. MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR AT THE BAR,
REBEL ON THE BENCH 37 (1994).
52. LARRY S. GIBSON, YOUNG THURGOOD: THE MAKING OF A SUPREME COURT JUSTICE 62–
63 (2012).
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Lincoln University in Pennsylvania, Marshall wanted to go to the University of
Maryland Law School, which would have been ideal—it was close to home,
had a good reputation, and had low in-state tuition.53 But the school did not
accept black students.54 Instead, Marshall enrolled at Howard Law School, a
predominantly black school that Marshall believed was for students who
couldn’t get in anywhere else.55
During his final year of law school, Marshall developed an association with
the NAACP when the civil rights organization enlisted Howard students and
faculty to help defend a black man accused of murdering two white women in
Virginia.56 The young lawyer continued doing part-time work for the NAACP
after graduation, including work on a suit against the University of Maryland
Law School for its refusal to admit black students—a case with special
resonance for Marshall given his experience.57 Ultimately, Marshall joined the
NAACP’s national office in 1936 with the express assignment of working on
educational equality.58
Marshall’s call to advocate for educational equality coincided with other
forces at work that helped pave the road to Brown. Having witnessed the horror
of Hitler’s genocide and Japanese imperialism, post-WWII Americans were
more aware and troubled about injustices based on race.59 The new post-war
focus on humanitarianism created an impetus for litigation aimed at civil
rights.60 At the same time, psychology and sociology as a means of
understanding human behavior were playing a growing role in economic and
government policy.61
In 1954, elementary schools throughout the South were racially segregated,
based on the 1896 ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson that solidified the legality of
“separate but equal” institutions.62 Initially, Marshall and his colleagues
refrained from challenging the “separate” part of Plessy v. Ferguson’s “separate
but equal” rule when it came to elementary schools, considering it a difficult53. JUAN WILLIAMS, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 52 (1998).
54. Id.
55. Id. at 53.
56. Id. at 58.
57. See Pearson v. Murray, 182 A. 590, 590 (Md. 1936).
58. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 53, at 84–85; GIBSON, supra note 52,
at 307–08.
59. DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 51, at 136; ANTHONY G. AMSTERDAM & JEROME BRUNER,
MINDING THE LAW 268 (2000).
60. RANDALL WALTON BLAND, JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL: CRUSADER FOR
LIBERALISM—HIS JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY (1908–1993) 55 (2001).
61. DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 51, at 137.
62. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
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to-win “bombshell.”63 Instead, the strategy had been to argue for equal
treatment—better schools and equal funding.64 In other words, they argued that
maintaining segregation was acceptable, but only if the treatment was
sufficiently similar.65 After all, challenging segregation directly would require
not just overturning Plessy’s long-standing precedent but also confronting a
deeply-established cultural norm. If Marshall’s team was going to challenge
such a foundational aspect of American life, it was going to need an “airtight,”
persuasive argument.66
In the years leading up to the Brown case, Marshall and his team had made
incremental progress, successfully persuading courts to allow integration in
higher education to some extent, such as with the University of Maryland Law
School case.67 While those successes resulted in greater opportunity for black
graduate students, the team realized that such gains would have minimal impact
if disparities in early education persisted.68 If students could not be adequately
prepared for college, few black students would be able to attend, and little
progress would result. Although Marshall feared that going after segregation
at the grade school level could backfire,69 he began to consider it after a federal
court in California held that it was unconstitutional to segregate MexicanAmerican school children.70
The team knew that taking on Plessy could not be based on just one lower
court’s analysis or the Supreme Court precedent that applied to college and
graduate students.71
Marshall needed a way to change the entire scope of the argument and
persuade the Court that segregation itself was fundamentally unfair and
damaging to students. Showing that segregation per se caused damage was a

63. See DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 51, at 138; WILLIAMS, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY, supra
note 53, at 196.
64. DAVIS & CLARK, supra note 51, at 138.
65. See id.
66. Pauli Murray, “Members of Your Race Are Not Admitted…,” in SONG IN A WEARY THROAT:
AN AMERICAN PILGRIMAGE (1987).
67. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 53, at 195; Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629, 636 (1950); Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 337 (1938).
68. LANGSTON HUGHES, FIGHT FOR FREEDOM: THE STORY OF THE NAACP 137 (1962).
69. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 53, at 195.
70. Id. at 196; Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544, 549 (S.D. Cal. 1946) (“The
equal protection of the laws pertaining to the public school system in California is not provided by
furnishing in separate schools the same technical facilities, text books and courses of instruction to
children of Mexican ancestry that are available to the other public school children regardless of their
ancestry.”) (internal quotations omitted), aff’d, 161 F.2d 774, 781 (9th Cir. 1947).
71. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY, supra note 53, at 96–97.
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particular challenge because the Plessy Court had found just the opposite.72
Although not a school case—the case involved separate railcar
accommodations—the Court held that segregation was not only permissible
under the Fourteenth Amendment, but that laws requiring segregation “do not
necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other.”73 Thus, the team
needed to establish that segregation had an inherently negative psychological
impact to directly contradict what the Plessy Court had found.
The segregation cases that preceded Brown, like the one against the
University of Maryland Law School, did provide a possible opening.74 In these
cases, the states had argued that they complied with Plessy if they offered
graduate students the same legal education while requiring the black students
to sit separately in the classroom and in the cafeteria.75 The Supreme Court
rejected this solution.76 It held that such an arrangement had only the
appearance of equality and that separating black students had an intangible but
significant detrimental impact on their learning, thus causing a fundamental
inequality.77 The Court’s focus on “intangible[s]” emboldened Marshall and
his team to raise the issue of the psychological effect separate schools had on
black children.78 But how could he get that idea across to nine middle-aged (or
elderly) white men, most of whom had likely never been in a black
neighborhood or school?
Marshall’s idea was that, although the physical differences between white
and black schools were fundamentally unfair, it was the “undeniable personality
damage and serious injury to the human personality” that made segregation
inherently unequal and unconstitutional.79 This line of argument led Marshall
to the work of Kenneth and Mamie Clark, psychologists from New York who
had studied the impact of segregation on black children’s sense of inferiority.80
Marshall enlisted the Clarks to conduct studies of black children in the Southern
school districts where Marshall was bringing lawsuits.81

72. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
73. Id.
74. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 636 (1950); McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents, 339 U.S. 637,
637 (1950).
75. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633.
76. Id. at 634.
77. Id. at 634–35.
78. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493–94 (1954).
79. HUGHES, supra note 68, at 138.
80. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND
BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 315–16 (1975).
81. Id. at 315.
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In May 1951, Marshall and Kenneth Clark traveled to the small farming
town of Summerton, South Carolina.82 Clark brought with him an unusual box:
The box contained the tools of Clark’s particular trade: dolls.
There were four of them, each about a foot high and sexually
neuter. Dressed only in diapers, they were identical except for
one thing: two of them were pink and two of them were brown.
They had cost fifty cents each at a five-and-ten [cent store] on
125th Street [in New York] . . . .83
Dr. Clark and his wife had used the dolls in experiments to show
segregation’s effect on children.84 The Clarks presented black children with the
four dolls and asked a series of questions such as: “Give me the doll you like to
play with” and “Give me the doll that is the nice doll.”85 They discovered that
the majority of the children preferred the white doll, because it was the “nice”
doll.86 These findings and other observations led Dr. Clark to conclude that the
children carried a “tremendous burden of feelings of inadequacy and inferiority
which seem to become integrated into the very structure of personality as it’s
developing.”87
Marshall was known for his direct, common-sense approach to arguments,
so it’s not a surprise that his brief was all of thirteen pages.88 The brief argued
that segregation “interferes with [a black child’s] motivation for learning and
instills in him a feeling of inferiority resulting in a personal insecurity,
confusion, and frustration that condemns him to an ineffective role as a citizen
and member of society.”89
By zeroing in on the effect of segregation on a “[black] child,” Marshall
used classic storytelling tools. He emphasized the central sympathetic character
in the child’s story, painting a picture of how the child’s sense of self is harmed
now and will continue to be harmed unless the Court protects him by ending

82. Bitter Resistance: Clarendon County, South Carolina, NAT’L MUSEUM AM. HIST.,
https://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/4-five/clarendon-county-3.html [https://perma.cc/BU6BGFHC] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
83. KLUGER, supra note 80, at 315.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 316.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 138. In more recent years, the Doll Test has been met with criticism. See, e.g., Gwen
Bergner, Black Children, White Preference: Brown v. Board, the Doll Tests, and the Politics of SelfEsteem, 61 AM. Q. 299, 301 (2009).
88. Brief for Appellants, supra note 50, at 13.
89. Id. at 9.
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segregation.90 The child became the story’s protagonist, and segregation the
evil to be overcome. The Court was invited to become the hero.91
Marshall spends only a few paragraphs creating this narrative in his brief.92
The real power of his message was achieved in an appendix—a novel strategy
in the 1950s.93 Perhaps even more novel was the nature of the appendix.
Written as a report by thirty-two social scientists, the appendix was titled, “The
Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of Desegregation: A Social
Science Statement.”94 Taking a readable, narrative approach, the report made
the child of the “minority group” central to its focus. First, referring to the
affected children as a collective, the report cited that many of these children:
[B]ecome confused about their own personal worth. On the
one hand, like all other human beings they require a sense of
personal dignity; on the other hand, almost nowhere in the
larger society do they find their own dignity as human beings
respected by others.95
From this collective, the narrative singled out “the child”:
Under these conditions, the minority group child is thrown into
a conflict with regard to his feelings about himself and his
group. He wonders whether his group and he himself are
worthy of no more respect than they receive. This conflict and
confusion leads to self-hatred and rejection of his own group.96
Marshall used these findings to illustrate to the Supreme Court justices how
it felt to be in the shoes of the segregated black child. By making that emotional
connection, Marshall gave the Justices a sense of the underlying injustice and
unfairness of segregation—a powerful rationale that the Court relied upon in
their decision to overturn Plessy.97
90. Id.
91. See Robbins, Harry Potter, supra note 35, at 782.
92. Brief for Appellants, supra note 50, at 9.
93. Appendix to Appellants’ Brief, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1); see
Jeremy Blumenthal, Law and Social Science in the Twenty-First Century, 12 S. CA. INTERDISC. L.J. 1,
14 (2002).
94. Appendix to Appellants’ Brief, supra note 93, at 1.
95. Id. at 4.
96. Appendix to Appellants’ Brief, supra note 93, at 4.
97. Raymond Wolters, Constitutional History, Social Science, and Brown v. Board of Education
1954–1964, 5 THE OCCIDENTAL Q., Spring 2005, at 19–20 (“Clark had the satisfaction of knowing
that his doll test and social science statement made a crucial contribution to the NAACP’s victory in
Brown. The Supreme Court had found the NAACP’s historical argument inconclusive, but it pricked
up its ears when the NAACP’s social scientists said that segregation fostered feelings of inferiority that
hampered the education of blacks. Historian Alfred Kelly conceded, ‘[Clark’s] black and white dolls
won the case, not the historians.’ In tribute to the NAACP’s premier psychologist and most influential
witness, some social scientists referred to Brown as the ‘Ken Clark law.’”).
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Using data-based social science research was a new idea at the time, but its
incorporation of “real life” experience allowed Marshall to create a narrative
that tapped into the Court’s sense of empathy and allowed the Justices to see
the harm through the eyes of the affected children. Although the social science
research was not the only factor that led to the Court’s decision to overturn
Plessy, the Justices felt its impact. To separate black children from their white
peers solely because of their race, the Court said, “generates a feeling of
inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”98 Marshall successfully engaged
the Justices with a story that they could empathize and identify with. The power
of that story created the conditions whereby nine white men could look past
centuries of tradition and begin a new chapter in American history.
B. Frontiero v. Richardson: Ruth Bader Ginsburg Stands Up for the “Long
Silenced Majority”99
Before Ruth Bader Ginsburg was the “Notorious RBG”100 and a Supreme
Court justice, she was an activist, a “trailblaz[er],”101 and the “Thurgood
Marshall of the women’s movement”102 for her legal work to create gender
equality in United States law.103 Ginsburg herself was no stranger to sex
discrimination—she had faced it explicitly as a student in law school where the
dean asked her and the eight other women in her class why they were taking up
seats that could be filled by men, and as a professor, where she fought to even
the pay inequity between male and female professors.104 These experiences
spurred her into the activism that led her to co-found the ACLU Women’s
Rights Project in 1972.105 Frontiero, a case that Ginsburg brought on behalf of

98. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
99. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Comment: Frontiero v. Richardson, WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP., Summer
1973, at 4.
100. IRIN CARMON & SHANA KNIZHNIK, NOTORIOUS RBG: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF RUTH
BADER GINSBURG 7 (2015); see also Lauren Kelley, How Ruth Bader Ginsburg Became the ‘Notorious
RBG,’ ROLLING STONE (Oct. 27, 2015, 3:36 PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/culture/culturefeatures/how-ruth-bader-ginsburg-became-the-notorious-rbg-50388/ [https://perma.cc/9W2D-887B].
101. Kelley, supra note 100.
102. Wendy W. Williams, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Equal Protection Clause: 1970–80, 25
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 41, 41 (2013).
103. Id.
104. Toni J. Ellington, Sylvia K. Higashi, Jayna K. Kim & Mark M. Murakami, Comment,
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Gender Discrimination, 20 U. HAW. L. REV. 699, 705–06, 708
(1998).
105. Sandra Pullman, Tribute: The Legacy of Ruth Bader Ginsburg and WRP Staff, ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/other/tribute-legacy-ruth-bader-ginsburg-and-wrp-staff
[https://perma.cc/4XNX-Z67F] (last visited Jan. 26, 2019).
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the ACLU, broke new ground for women’s rights and paved the way for a legal
shift when it came to gender discrimination and the law.106
What makes a trailblazer in championing the rights of others in law? For
one, a trailblazer needs to have the courage to tell a story. Ginsburg became
the voice of women who did not have the voice to tell their own story, when
legal authorities for generations had been perpetuating a different story. For
another, a person must be able to see when the right strategic moment is to tell
the story. Ginsburg saw that moment happening in the 1970s with the
emergence of the ERA and other legislative reforms. And finally, a trailblazer
must have the wisdom to infuse both concrete facts and intangibles into that
story in a way that creates empathy and passion. Ginsburg created both
empathy and a strong legal argument by using an analogy to the AfricanAmerican experience in U.S. law to create a successful bridge to the women’s
movement.107
Appellate courts must consider not only an individual’s case, but the
broader implications of a decision on a group. In Frontiero and other Supreme
Court cases Ginsburg vocalized—she literally brought a voice to—women who
otherwise had not been historically heard in the legal power centers in the U.S.
Lieutenant Frontiero’s situation became, instead of an isolated story of a female
soldier in Alabama being denied housing and medical benefits, the story of all
women’s injuries at being slighted under U.S. laws. Her briefs and oral
argument necessarily were inserted in the Supreme Court’s lexicon and
dialogue with the public instead of being confined to closeted and silenced
conversations among women. She carried the message to the nation’s highest
tribunal where the message could not be ignored.
Frontiero was part of a broader narrative in Ginsburg’s work to push gender
equality at the Supreme Court between 1970 and 1980, when she left for the
judiciary.108 Ginsburg’s goal was to eliminate “‘sex-role pigeon-holing.’”109

106. For a thorough discussion of the history of Frontiero v. Richardson, see Serena Mayeri,
“When the Trouble Started”: The Story of Frontiero v. Richardson, in WOMEN AND THE LAW STORIES
57 (Elizabeth M. Schneider and Stephanie M. Wildman eds., 2011); see also Iselin M. Gambert,
Commentary on Frontiero v. Richardson, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 168, 168 (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J.
Crawford eds., 2016).
107. Gambert, supra note 106, at 170 (explaining that Ginsburg also drew an analogy between
women and African Americans in her brief in Reed v. Reed).
108. See Berta Esperanza Hernandez-Truyol, Talking Back: From Feminist History and Theory
to Feminist Legal Methods and Judgments, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS: REWRITTEN OPINIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 42 (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford
eds., 2016).
109. Williams, Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Equal Protection Clause, supra note 102, at 45.
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Men and women both benefited from women’s equality, as neither sex benefits
from being boxed into a particular stereotype.110 Harm to one sex was really a
harm to both men and women, as exemplified by the Frontiero case, where both
husband and wife were denied access to benefits.111 Ginsburg had already
participated in the briefing in Reed v. Reed, the first Supreme Court decision to
apply the Equal Protection clause to women.112
In Frontiero, the Supreme Court in 1973 considered whether the unequal
treatment of military servicemen and women under statutes providing for
medical and dental benefits for dependents violated due process.113 Male
servicemen were allowed to claim their wives as dependents without needing
to show whether their wives were, in fact, depending on the servicemen for
support.114 The servicewomen, in contrast, had to show, by producing an
affidavit, how their husbands depended on over one-half of their support to
claim those benefits.115
Sharon Frontiero was an army soldier who sought the increased quarter’s
allowances and housing and medical benefits for her husband as a dependent.116
Frontiero failed to demonstrate that her husband depended on her for more than
one-half of his support, and the military denied her request for benefits.117
The Frontieros, who at the time were represented by the Southern Poverty
Law Center, sued the government.118 Both wife and husband were parties in
the case.119 In examining the whole statutory scheme, the district court’s
majority opinion (a 2–1 decision in a three-judge district court decision) found
the legislation did not invidiously differentiate between service members and,
viewed more narrowly, the statutes were constitutional because they satisfied
the requirements of rational basis review.120
However, the majority opinion also addressed “a subtler injury” the court
perceived was “lurking behind the scenes,” which was “the indignity a woman
may feel, as a consequence of being the one left out of the windfall, of having
110. Id. at 46.
111. Id.
112. 404 U.S. 71, 76–77 (1971); see Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Comment on Reed v. Reed,
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP., 1972, at 7, 8 (calling the decision a “small step forward”).
113. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678 (1973) (citing 37 U.S.C. §§ 401, 403; 10 U.S.C.
§§ 1072, 1076).
114. Id. (citing 37 U.S.C. §§ 401(1); 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072(2)(A)).
115. Id. (citing 37 U.S.C. §401; 10 U.S.C. §§ 1072(2)(C)).
116. Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 680.
117. Id.
118. Frontiero v. Laird, 341 F. Supp. 201, 203 (M.D. Ala. 1972).
119. Id. at 203–04.
120. Id. at 206.
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to traverse the added red tape of proving her husband’s dependency, and, most
significantly, of being treated differently.”121 The court explained it was “not
insensitive,” but that these grievances misunderstood the legislation’s
purpose.122 The statutory scheme, the court concluded, was not “merely a child
of Congress’ ‘romantic paternalism’ and ‘Victorianism,’” but rather, an
administrative and economic aid based partly on sex.123
On a direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Ginsburg argued as amicus for
strict scrutiny review.124 Eight justices determined that the statutes were
unconstitutional.125 While the members of the Court disagreed about what
standard of review to apply to sex discrimination cases, four of the justices
agreed with Ginsburg’s argument for strict scrutiny.126
Several themes run through Ginsburg’s amicus brief: “woman’s place,”127
“benign classifications,”128 and “enlightened courts.”129 These themes convey
a narrative of women’s rights and sex discrimination in the U.S. Ginsburg used
two analogies to show that sex is an inherently suspect class.130 First, she
compared the treatment of women to the treatment of African Americans in
U.S. history: just as the Court had applied strict scrutiny to cases involving race,
so should it apply strict scrutiny to sex.131 Second, she highlighted a narrative
spun by men in American public forums, which portrayed women as weak and
requiring benign legislation.132 She showed that, in fact, such legislation is not

121. Id. at 209.
122. Id.
123. Id. The dissent, however, concluded the statutes were unconstitutional because they failed
rational basis. Id. at 210 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
124. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678 (1973).
125. Id. at 677–78. Specifically, a plurality of the Court—Justice Brennan joined by Justice
Douglas, Justice White, and Justice Marshall—concluded that the statutes were inherently suspect
statutory classifications based on sex and subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 687. Justice Stewart concurred
on the basis that the statutes worked an invidious discrimination. Id. at 692 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Justice Powell—joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun—agreed that the statutes
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment but argued that it was inappropriate to identify
sex as a suspect criterion. Id. at 691–92 (Powell, J., Burger, C.J., Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 691 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
126. Id. (Justices Brennan (author), Douglas, White, and Marshall).
127. Brief for the American Civil Liberties Union as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiffs at 17,
Frontiero v. Laird, sub. nom. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (No. 71-1694) [hereinafter
Brief for the ACLU] (co-authored with Melvin L. Wulf, Brenda Feigen Fasteau, and Marc Feigen
Fasteau).
128. E.g., id. at 34 (internal quotations omitted).
129. E.g., id. at 27.
130. Id. at 6–7.
131. E.g., id. at 14.
132. Id. at 34–44.
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benign and that it injures women, who otherwise are strong and can stand on
their own.133
Ginsburg referred to the “myth and custom” underlying sex as a suspect
classification.134 That myth and custom “assumes that the male is the dominant
partner in marriage,” and it “reinforces restrictive and outdated sex role
stereotypes about married women and their participation in the work force.”135
Ginsburg cited examples where women were referred to as inferior, weak, or
unable to play a full role in society.136 She equated these clear, precise, public
examples of women’s inferior legal status with African Americans’ status
before the Civil War under the slave codes.137
American politicians such as Thomas Jefferson138 and Grover Cleveland139
perpetuated the myth of the dominant male and the inferior woman. Ginsburg
recounted how Alexis de Tocqueville described these American customs: “‘In
no country has such constant care been taken as in America to trace two clearly
distinct lines of action for the two sexes, and to make them keep pace one with
the other, but in two pathways which are always different.’”140 Gender
stereotypes in the law, Ginsburg showed, were inherited from British common
law.141 Alfred Lord Tennyson explained how “‘[t]he common law heritage, a
source of pride for men, marked the wife as her husband’s chattel, ‘something
better than his dog, a little dearer than his horse.’”142

133. Id. at 15–17.
134. Id. at 7, 11 (“‘Man’s world’ and ‘woman’s place’ have confronted each other since Scylla
first faced Charybdis.”) (quoting ELIZABETH JANEWAY, MAN’S WORLD, WOMAN’S PLACE: A STUDY
IN SOCIAL MYTHOLOGY 7 (1971)). For a further discussion of myth in legal narrative, see Linda H.
Edwards, Where Do the Prophets Stand?: Hamdi, Myth and the Master’s Tools, 13 CONN. PUB. INT.
L.J. 43, 45 (2013).
135. Brief for the ACLU, supra note 127, at 7.
136. E.g., id. at 13 (1866 debate in Congress) (debate quoted in ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY
OF STRUGGLE: THE WOMAN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 148–49 (1970), from
Cong. Globe, 39 Cong., 2d Sess., Part I, p. 66).
137. Id. at 14 (stating the legal status of women and children provided a model for slaves’ legal
status in the slave codes).
138. Id. at 11 (Jefferson quoted in MARTIN GRUBERG, WOMEN IN AMERICAN POLITICS: AN
ASSESSMENT AND SOURCEBOOK 4 (1968)).
139. Id. at 15 (citing Grover Cleveland, Would Woman Suffrage Be Unwise?, LADIES HOME J.,
1904–05, at 7–8, quoted in UP FROM THE PEDESTAL: SELECTED WRITINGS IN THE HISTORY OF
AMERICAN FEMINISM 199–203 (Aileen S. Kraditor ed., 1968)).
140. Id. at 12 (de Tocqueville quoted in Democracy in America, pt. 2 (Reeves tr. 1840), in
WORLD’S CLASSICS SERIES, Galaxy eel., p. 400 (1947)).
141. Id. at 13–14 (citing 1 BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 442 (3d.
ed. 1768).
142. Id. at 13 (quoting ALFRED LORD TENNYSON, LOCKSLEY HALL (1842)).
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But women protested and struggled against these characterizations,
Ginsburg asserted.143 Women recognized the injustice—the inferior
classifications into which they were being cast.144 For example, a declaration
of women’s rights at the 1848 Women’s Rights Convention in Seneca Falls,
New York described how man “‘has endeavored, in every way that he could, to
destroy [a woman’s] confidence in her own powers, to lessen her self-respect,
and to make her willing to lead a dependent and abject life.’”145
The women of the day, despite this treatment, endeavored to identify their
strength, independence, and humanity.146 Sojourner Truth spoke for women’s
suffrage: “‘I have ploughed and planted and gathered into barns, and no man
could head me—and ain’t I a woman? I could work as much and eat as much
as a man—when I could get it—and bear the lash as well! And ain’t I a
woman?’”147
Ginsburg reported that at the time the brief was written, in the early 1970’s,
some progress had been made in federal legislation, and momentum was
growing in favor of the ERA.148 She noted how legislation still put women in
a place subordinate to men.149 This was a time, though, when “[e]nlightened
courts” were striking down sex classifications, and “the national conscience
ha[d] been awakened to the sometimes subtle injury inflicted on women by
these stereotypes.”150
In the joint reply brief, Ginsburg and counsel for the Frontieros argued that
the ERA should be supported by the Court’s decisions, because under the Equal
Protection Clause, “legislative distinctions should not be made on the basis of
characteristics that bear no necessary relationship to ability and over which
persons have no control.”151
The joint reply emphasized how “total political silence was imposed on this
numerical majority” with “second-place status” for women in education, jobs,

143. Id. at 15–17.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 16 (declaration quoted in HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE, 1848–1861, at 70–75
(Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Susan B. Anthony & Matilda Joslyn Gage eds., 1881)).
146. Id. at 15–17.
147. Id. at 17 (Sojourner Truth quoted in Flexner, supra note 136, at 90–91); see also Mayeri,
supra note 106, at 79 (discussing the analogy between race and gender in the amicus brief).
148. Brief for the ACLU, supra note 127, at 17–20.
149. Id. at 17–18.
150. Id. at 7.
151. Joint Reply Brief of Appellants and American Civil Liberties Union Amici Curiae at 7,
Frontiero v. Laird, sub. nom. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (No. 71-1694) (co-authored
by counsel for amicus and Joseph J. Levin, Jr. and Morris S. Dees, Jr.).
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and politics.152 The reply asserted that classifications to protect women, and
which were labelled benign, created a separate but equal position for women in
society.153 They argued that the traits associated with American women are
valued less.154
The reply ended with a passionate entreaty on behalf of “women who want
to exercise options that do not fit within stereotypical notions of what is proper
for a female, women who do not want to be ‘protected’ but do want to develop
their individual potential without artificial constraints . . . .”155 For these
women, “classifications reinforcing traditional male-female roles are hardly
‘benign.’”156
Picking up themes from her briefs, Ginsburg began her oral argument with
the analogy to Reed, stating that in both cases “[t]he legislative judgment in
both derives from the same stereotype. The man is or should be the independent
partner in a marital unit. The woman with an occasional exception, is
dependent, sheltered from bread winning experience.”157
Regardless of the lack of evidence in Frontiero as to the number of
servicemen who had wage-earning wives, she said, “[w]hat is known is that by
employing the sex criterion, identically situated persons are treated differently.
The married serviceman gets benefits for himself, as well as his spouse
regardless of her income[,]” she said, while a married servicewoman like
Frontiero, earning two-thirds of the family income, is denied benefits.158 And,
for these reasons, she said, the legislation failed the rationality standard.159
Ginsburg then asked the Court to declare sex a suspect criterion. As she
had in her briefs, Ginsburg drew a second analogy, this time to race: “Sex like
race is a visible, immutable characteristic bearing no necessary relationship to
ability. Sex like race has been made the basis for unjustified or at least
unproved assumptions, concerning an individual’s potential to perform or to
contribute to society.”160

152. Id. at 8.
153. Id. at 12.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 13.
156. Id.
157. Transcript of Oral Argument at 15, Frontiero v. Laird, sub. nom. Frontiero v. Richard 411
U.S. 677 (1973) (No. 71-1694), https://www.oyez.org/cases/1972/71-1694 [https://perma.cc/HX2E6W29]. Levin carved out time for Ginsburg from his oral argument. Mayeri, supra note 106, at 69.
158. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 15.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 16–17.
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Ginsburg addressed the government’s position that sex did not deserve the
same constitutional protections as race. The Fourteenth Amendment’s purpose,
she said, was “to eliminate invidious racial discrimination.”161 And, both a
person’s skin color and their sex “bears no necessary relationship to ability.”162
Ginsburg knocked down the government’s two points against sex as a
suspect criterion: (1) that women are a majority population, and (2) that
classification by sex does not imply women’s inferiority.163 To combat these
points, Ginsburg reminded the Court that women were denied the right to vote
until 1920, that women face pervasive and subtle employment discrimination,
that women face restrictive quotas, and that women are absent from state and
federal government positions.164
Ginsburg provided examples of the stigma, exclusion, and “judgment of
inferiority” that injure women.165 She said, “[t]hese distinctions have a
common effect. They help keep woman in her place, a place inferior to that
occupied by men in our society.”166 Ginsburg said that regardless of the ERA’s
ratification, “clarification of the application of equal protection to the sex
criterion is needed and should come from this Court.”167
Ginsburg concluded with vigor, urging a position “forcibly stated in 1837
by Sarah Grimk[é], noted abolitionist and advocate of equal rights for men and
women. She spoke, not elegantly, but with unmistakable clarity. She said, ‘I
ask no favor for my sex. All I ask of our brethren is that they take their feet off
our necks.’”168
Unusual for that time, no one on the Court asked Ginsburg any questions
during her oral argument,169 but the themes in her briefs and her oral argument
play a central role in the Court’s decision.
The plurality found Ginsburg’s arguments on the standard of review
convincing.170 Central to the plurality opinion is the very language that
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id.; see also Mayeri, supra note 106, at 69–71 (discussing Ginsburg’s oral argument).
164. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 157, at 17–18.
165. Id. at 18.
166. Id. at 19.
167. Id. at 20.
168. Id. (“I ask no favors for my sex. I surrender not our claim to equality. All I ask of our
brethren is, that they will take their feet from off our necks, and permit us to stand upright on that
ground which God designed us to occupy.”) (quoting Sarah Grimke, Letter II: Women Subject Only
ON
THE
EQUALITY
OF
THE
SEXES
(1837),
To
God,
in
LETTERS
https://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Sarah_Grimk%C3%A9 [https://perma.cc/WGH6-LZAU]).
169. Mayeri, supra note 106, at 70.
170. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684–87 (1973).
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Ginsburg used in her amicus brief.171 Referring to a “paternalistic attitude,” the
Court stated that “[t]here can be no doubt that our Nation has had a long and
unfortunate history of sex discrimination.”172
Ginsburg’s detailed examples and analogies come through as the Court
decried the abuses of the past: “As a result of notions such as these, our statute
books gradually became laden with gross, stereotyped distinctions between the
sexes . . . .”173 Specifically, the Court stated, “throughout much of the 19th
century the position of women in our society was, in many respects, comparable
to that of blacks in pre-Civil War slave codes. Neither slaves nor women could
hold office, serve on juries, . . . or serve as legal guardians of their own
children.”174
In her comments on Frontiero, Ginsburg noted the swift progress from
Reed to Frontiero.175 The decision would notify the legislature and lower
courts, which had a responsibility to the “long silenced majority,” that sex
discrimination in law would be subject to “rigorous” constitutional review in
the Supreme Court.176 Ginsburg further advocated for the ERA’s ratification,
to ensure that “women and men stand as full and equal individuals before the
law.”177 This concern that women and men would both be equals is a human
ideal not driven by a cost-benefit analysis, or a data-driven administrative
convenience argument. This is a far-sighted argument that speaks to the core
of justice.
In our view, in 2019, AI’s abilities are still essentially binary, employing
input-output driven forms of reasoning, while human reasoning has multifaceted depth and employs perceptions that humans cultivate through nonlinear learning. Ginsburg’s argument in Frontiero demonstrates a non-binary
form of argument. AI uses linear optimization; an argument such as Ginsburg’s
optimizes both an individual litigant’s and societal goals.
C. Alaska v. EPA: John Roberts Finds and Then Tells the Less-Obvious Story
Lawyers know that stories persuade all humans, even judges.178 But when
we think about using stories in the law, we often think of situations when the
stories are both compelling and easy to tell. A few examples of such easy
171. See id. at 684.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 685.
174. Id.
175. Ginsburg, supra note 99, at 3–4 (noting the importance of the decision in light of the
pervasive legislative pattern in the case).
176. Id. at 2, 4.
177. Id. at 4.
178. ROBBINS, JOHANSEN & CHESTEK, supra note 26, at 39.
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stories include stories about people serving time in jail for crimes they did not
commit, poor and uneducated tenants being unfairly evicted from their homes,
and victims of blatant discrimination suffering indignities and economic harm.
Anyone who hears these stories will immediately identify the injustices.
But what about those stories that aren’t so easy to tell? What about a
contract dispute between two huge corporations where the conflict is about who
gets more money? What about a criminal defendant who is tied by unrefuted
DNA evidence to the crime? What about a bankruptcy case where various
creditors are vying for priority over other creditors? What about a tax case
when a state is trying to collect taxes on purchases its citizens made in another
state?
Perhaps AI will one day be able to tell the easy stories. But it will take a
real human lawyer to find those stories when they aren’t obvious. And it will
take a real human lawyer to frame the difficult story to persuade the reader.
John Roberts, now the Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, is
a fine example of how a real human lawyer found, framed, and told a
compelling story in what, at first blush, was a case that did not scream “story.”
In one of the last briefs he wrote in private practice,179 Roberts brought a basic
federalism case to life through storytelling.
The facts in Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation v. EPA180
were straightforward. Alaska, before it could build a generator near protected
land, conducted an extensive review process to identify the best available
control technology (“BACT”) to comply with the Clean Air Act.181 The EPA
then came in and said Alaska should have selected a more effective solution to
control emissions.182 Alaska’s theme was that the EPA could not second-guess
their well-informed decision.183 One commentator noted, “Roberts likely
179. Roberts was working for a private law firm when he wrote the Petitioner’s brief, but did not
write the Reply brief, presumably because he was named to the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. See
LIBRARY
(Jan.
15,
2019,
4:22
PM)
John
Roberts
Fast
Facts,
CNN
https://www.cnn.com/2013/03/25/us/john-g-roberts-fast-facts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/JL7SE2JL]. He also did not argue the case in the United States Supreme Court.
180. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540 U.S. 461, 461 (2004).
181. Id. at 475–76.
182. Id. at 478.
183. The theme did not change but the lawyers did because Roberts was no longer representing
the State of Alaska, so Jonathan S. Franklin argued the case in front of the United States Supreme
Court. Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
540 U.S. 461 (2004) (No. 02-658), https://www.oyez.org/cases/2003/02-658 [https://perma.cc/97CKNA5S]. Here is Franklin’s opening line during the oral argument:
The question in this case is whether the Federal Environmental Protection Agency
has the legal authority to override by fiat a discretionary determination that
Congress expressly directed be made instead by the State of Alaska, which
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realized [that this theme] would resonate, for we all know how frustrating it can
be for a boss, parent, spouse or relative [to] question from afar an informed
decision we’ve made.”184
The crux of the legal issue was whether the EPA had to challenge Alaska’s
decision through the available state review process (Alaska’s argument) or
whether the EPA could (as it did) issue a series of orders prohibiting the
construction of the generators.185 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the EPA; so
did the United States Supreme Court.186
So, yes, despite Roberts’s eloquent storytelling, his client lost the case. The
loss doesn’t mean that lawyers can’t learn from master storytellers and try to
emulate their craft.187 Ruth Bader Ginsburg called Roberts “the ‘best’ advocate
to come before the Supreme Court.”188 Even Senator Chuck Schumer, who
voted against Roberts’s nomination, called him “one of the best advocates, if
not the best advocate in the nation.”189
Lawyers, like all storytellers, know they should let their facts “show, not
tell.”190 Roberts proved that maxim by personalizing his government client and
telling the story from his client’s point of view. Roberts told the story of how
the Red Dog Mine got its name:
For generations, Inupiat Eskimos hunting and fishing in the
DeLong Mountains in Northwest Alaska had been aware of
orange- and red-stained creekbeds in which fish could not
survive. In the 1960s, a bush pilot and part-time prospector by
the name of Bob Baker noticed striking discolorations in the
hills and creekbeds of a wide valley in the western DeLongs.
Congress trusted to exercise its own independent judgment according to local
priorities and local conditions.
Id. Later in the argument, Franklin refined the theme a bit to emphasize that the statute does not require
federal uniformity: “EPA understands . . . and that is the nub of this case . . . that the BACT
determination is not supposed to be a uniform Federal standard.” Id. at 21.
184. Thomas Villecco, Storytime: How Lawyers Can Use Narrative Techniques in Brief Writing,
LAWYERIST.COM (Apr. 16, 2013), https://lawyerist.com/storytime-how-lawyers-can-use-narrativetechniques-in-brief-writing/ [https://perma.cc/JJ9H-YK4V].
185. Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation, 540 U.S. at 469.
186. Id. at 463, 469.
187. I first became aware of Roberts’s work in this case after reading Ross Guberman’s excellent
article about the Roberts brief. See generally Ross Guberman, Five Ways to Write Like John Roberts,
WRITING
PRO
(2010),
https://www.legalwritingpro.com/pdf/john-roberts.pdf
LEGAL
[https://perma.cc/93D8-N54U] [hereinafter Guberman, Five Ways].
188. ROSS GUBERMAN, POINT MADE: HOW TO WRITE LIKE THE NATION’S TOP ADVOCATES 60
(2d ed. 2014) (Ginsburg made the comment when “Roberts was nominated to be Chief”) [hereinafter
GUBERMAN, POINT MADE].
189. Guberman, Five Ways, supra note 187 (internal quotations omitted).
190. Id.
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Unable to land his plane on the rocky tundra to investigate,
Baker alerted the U.S. Geological Survey. Exploration of the
area eventually led to the discovery of a wealth of zinc and lead
deposits. Although Baker died before the significance of his
observations became known, his faithful traveling
companion—an Irish Setter who often flew shotgun—was
immortalized by a geologist who dubbed the creek Baker had
spotted “Red Dog” Creek.191
Years later, Roberts was interviewed about effective advocacy, and he
highlighted this slice from his own lawyer days:
You’ve got to find some way of trying to bond your reader with
the brief. He can pick it up later on and say, “Oh, this is the
case about . . . [.]” And it can be something silly. I remember
I had a cert petition once with a mine in rural Alaska. It was
called the Red Dog Mine. Well, I didn’t know why it was
called the Red Dog Mine, so you do some research. It’s a
fascinating story about a guy with his plane and his faithful red
dog delivering emergency medicine in a blizzard, and the plane
crashes, and the dog dies. You waste a couple of sentences in
a brief, but you put that in there, and it’s kind of interesting.
Then everybody remembers that. Oh, that’s the case about the
Red Dog Mine. And they’re kind of invested in it, and they
want to see how the story ends up, and it gives a little texture
to the brief.192
Quibbling with a Supreme Court Justice is not generally recommended, but
Roberts did not “waste a couple of sentences” in that brief. Instead, those few
sentences were the essence of how Roberts built empathy for his client when a
reader’s normal inclination may be to avoid any sympathy for the company
accused of polluting the pristine Alaska wilderness.
Notice how Roberts’s human creativity and curiosity inspired him to learn
about and then include the memorable little tale about the naming of the Red
Dog Mine. Even conceding that AI may take over rote legal tasks, it is hard to
imagine how AI could ever mimic the inquiring mind of a human. It was the
question that Roberts posed, “I didn’t know why it was called the Red Dog
Mine,” that made all the difference.

191. Brief for Petitioner at 7–8, Alaska Dep’t of Envtl. Conservation v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 540
U.S. 461 (2004) (No. 02-658), https://www.findlawimages.com/efile/supreme/briefs/02-658/02658.mer.pet.pdf [https://perma.cc/55PE-8ECN].
192. Interview with Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., 13 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 17–18
(2010) (Bryan Garner interviewed Chief Justice Roberts on March 2, 2007) [hereinafter SCRIBES].
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Maybe it was the charming history of the Red Dog Mine’s naming that
inspired Roberts to connect with his client. The theme of the case, that a federal
government agency should not second-guess Alaska, was rooted in the reality
that the Red Dog Mine provided employment and a livelihood for hundreds of
Alaskans—mostly Inupiat Eskimos—who had previously suffered from high
unemployment rates.193 Here Roberts wrote about the impact the Red Dog
Mine had on the community:
Operating 365 days a year, 24 hours a day, the Red Dog Mine
is the largest private employer in the Northwest Arctic
Borough, an area roughly the size of the State of Indiana with
a population of about 7,000. The vast majority of the area’s
residents are Inupiat Eskimos whose ancestors have inhabited
the region for thousands of years. The region offers only
limited year-round employment opportunities, particularly in
the private sector; in the two years preceding Alaska’s permit
decision, the borough’s unemployment rate was the highest in
the State.
....
With nearly 600 workers, the mine’s payroll represents
over a quarter of the borough’s wage base. Prior to the mine’s
opening, the average wage in the borough was well below the
state average; a year after its opening, the borough’s average
exceeded that of the State.194
Roberts tied Alaska’s choice to boost the financial security of the local
people to his theme about state control. Look at how effectively Roberts’s
opening brief reveals that theme. Here are the first sentences of the first three
paragraphs in the Introduction:
Described as an “experiment in federalism,” [citation omitted]
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) assigns to the States an
important—indeed primary—role in air pollution prevention
and control.
....
The CAA by its terms thus gives the States the authority to
determine BACT for a particular source, and allows the States
broad discretion in making that determination.
....
In this case, the State of Alaska issued a permit for the
construction of a new electric generator at the Red Dog Mine,
located in Northwest Alaska some 100 miles north of the
193. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 191, at 9.
194. Id. (citations omitted).
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Arctic Circle. 195
Roberts emphasized that there is “no single, objectively ‘correct’ BACT
determination for any particular source.”196 Instead, Roberts said that what is
“best” in any situation is a “discretionary judgment based on the case-by-case
weighing of . . . factors.”197 Roberts started by giving a few examples of how
different states could weigh all factors and yet conclude that two completely
different selections are “best”:
For example, one State—experiencing little economic growth
in the pertinent area and concerned about the impact of
increased costs on a critically important employer—may select
as BACT for that employer a less stringent and less costly
technology that results in emissions consuming nearly all of
(but not more than) the available increment for growth.
Another State—experiencing vigorous economic growth and
faced with many competing permit applications—may select
as BACT for those applications a more stringent and more
costly technology that limits the impact of any particular new
source on the increment available for development. A third
State—in which ecotourism rather than more industrial
development is the priority—may select as BACT an even
more stringent and more costly technology, effectively
blocking any industrial expansion.198
The reader is easily drawn into these mini stories about how different states
might make different decisions. Subtly, these mini stories also further the
theme that Congress wanted the states, not the federal government, to decide
the particulars of their pollution control measures as long as they met the federal
standards. Allowing, and indeed even encouraging, states to experiment in
different ways strikes a familiar chord of “cooperative federalism.”199
But then Roberts kicked it up another notch. His analogy to what the “best”
decision would be in another situation—buying a car—is akin to watching a
masterful musician during an absolute peak performance:
Determining the “best” control technology is like asking
different people to pick the “best” car. Mario Andretti may
select a Ferrari; a college student may choose a Volkswagen
Beetle; a family of six a mini-van. A Minnesotan’s choice will
doubtless have four-wheel drive; a Floridian’s might well be a
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 23.
Id.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 17.
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convertible. The choices would turn on how the decisionmaker
weighed competing priorities such as cost, mileage, safety,
cargo space, speed, handling, and so on.200
Almost all readers will have had personal experience with buying a car,
allowing them to easily relate to the reality of weighing all the factors. Roberts
hints that the ultimate decision can be difficult. The family may have preferred
a sporty car, but the reality led them to the mini-van. Alaska may have preferred
a more restrictive solution, but the reality of the economic situation led them to
this BACT for this generator. Roberts logically pointed out that the EPA’s
suggested BACT was “not economically feasible” for the regional economy,
particularly when the end result of all improvements would “result in lower
overall . . . emissions” than would occur if the EPA dictated its preferred
technology on only one generator.201
It is doubtful that Roberts’s examples of Minnesotans and Floridians were
mere coincidence. Roberts could have made the same point by using examples
of drivers from Northern and Southern states. Instead, he included Minnesotans
and Floridians to paint a more vivid picture, and to further solidify his theme
that federalism encourages state experimentation. When states are named—
Alaska, Minnesota, and Florida—the reader can see the people in those states
and concede that those people should decide what is best for their state.
Legal writing expert Ross Guberman often uses Roberts’s brief as an
example of outstanding writing. He said, “When I run into lawyers who have
taken one of my brief-writing seminars, they often mention this example
[comparing choosing BACT to choosing a car], even years after taking the
workshop.”202 Guberman credits this lasting impression to Roberts’s
imaginative use of a very personal, easy-to-grasp choice. 203 Roberts, as a
human writer, is connecting with another human, the reader.
Roberts accurately predicted that the EPA would argue that its preference
to substitute SCR (selective catalytic reduction) as BACT would further
national consistency. So he ended the brief with a zinger: “When it came to
BACT, however, Congress had a different idea, and left that determination—
‘on a case-by-case basis’—to the States.”204 Roberts’s decision to use a short,
200. Id. at 24.
201. Id. at 13. Megan Boyd noted, “Roberts lost, but his argument is a wonderful example of
the power of logos. Think of the logic: how can Alaska have acted arbitrarily and capriciously if the
control technology it selected would result in lower overall emissions?” Megan Boyd, Logos in
(LEGAL)
WRITER
(Apr.
8,
2014,
5:43
AM),
Litigation,
LADY
http://ladylegalwriter.blogspot.com/2014/04/ [https://perma.cc/M6XJ-6UB4].
202. GUBERMAN, POINT MADE, supra note 188, at 212.
203. Id.
204. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 191, at 48.
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six-word quote—“on a case-by-case basis”—hammered home his theme that
the states needed flexibility.205
In the grand conflict between human versus AI, we would send Roberts into
the arena as the gladiator to represent human creativity, empathy, and judgment.
But even in the seemingly small decisions like the use of punctuation it is hard
to imagine that AI could ever achieve Roberts’s expertise. Take the em dash.
Many lawyers avoid the em dash, either because they aren’t quite sure how to
use it206 or because they have been warned that some readers might consider it
to be too informal.207 Review how Roberts brilliantly used em dashes in the
excerpts above from his brief for the State of Alaska. He sprinkled em dashes
throughout the entire brief as a way to emphasize important phrases and legal
points.208 Or consider the semicolon. Again, some lawyers might not
remember that semicolons can be used to unite two short, closely connected
sentences or main clauses.209 Roberts used the semicolon to contrast two
concepts: “In clean air areas, the federal government determines the maximum
allowable increases of certain emissions for certain pollutants; the States decide
how to allocate the available increments among competing sources for
economic development and growth.”210 Roberts made the same point about
federalism, and his use of the semicolon highlighted the stark contrast between
the role of the federal government and the role of the state.
Human curiosity, empathy, creativity, and judgment will provide the stories
and glimmers that can make the brief sparkle, and in turn persuade the readers
and listeners. Roberts, a master storyteller, put it like this:
It’s got to be a good story. Every lawsuit is a story. I don’t
care if it’s about a dry contract interpretation; you’ve got two
people who want to accomplish something, and they’re coming
together—that’s a story. And you’ve got to tell a good story.
Believe it or not, no matter how dry it is, something’s going on
that got you to this point, and you want it to be a little bit of a
page-turner, to have some sense of drama, some building up to
205. GUBERMAN, POINT MADE, supra note 188, at 304.
206. Bryan Garner suggests three different uses for the em dash: (1) Using a pair of em dashes
“to set off an inserted phrase that, because of what it modifies, needs to go in the middle of the
sentence”; (2) using a pair of em dashes to “set off a parenthetical phrase that you want to highlight”;
and (3) using an em dash “to tack an important afterthought.” BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING
IN PLAIN ENGLISH 154 (2001).
207. LAUREL CURRIE OATES & ANNE ENQUIST, THE LEGAL WRITING HANDBOOK 532 (5th
ed. 2010).
208. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 191, at 48.
209. See OATES & ENQUIST, supra note 207, at 672–73. Note that semicolons can also be used
“to separate items in a series if the items are long or if one or more of the items has internal
commas.” Id. at 674.
210. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 191, at 17.
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the legal arguments. I also think—again, it varies on your
forum—but certainly here at the Supreme Court and in the
courts of appeals, you’re looking for a couple of hooks in the
facts that hopefully are going to be repeated in one form or
another later on in the legal argument but also are going to
catch somebody’s interest. It may not have that much to do
with the substantive legal arguments, but you want it to catch
their eyes. Certainly here in the Supreme Court, in writing cert
petitions, for example, if you’re going to be looking at 9,000
of them over the course of a year, you’ve got to stand out from
the crowd a little bit. So you want to put something in there to
give them the hooks . . . . But give them some hook, and it
kind of helps draw them into the brief and carries them along
a little bit.211
Maybe AI could write a brief outlining the relevant law and facts in EPA v.
Alaska, but it is hard to imagine that the brief would be anywhere near as
readable, persuasive, and compelling as the one written by a masterful
storyteller like Roberts.
V. CONCLUSION
Alf White, the “real” James Herriot, was one of the greatest storytellers of
the 20th century. His bestselling stories about the life of an English country
veterinarian during the 1930s, 1940s, and 1950s captivated the world. White’s
son Jim, also a veterinarian, points out, “[Alf White] was an incredibly sensitive
man, with a deep interest in people. I think that’s what made him a wonderful
writer. One of the things that people get most wrong about my father is that he
wrote ‘nice little stories about animals.’. . . My father didn’t write about
animals—he wrote about people.”212
Ironically, many assume that we lawyers write about the law when, instead,
we too are writing about people. And we share one more thing with Alf White.
He was capturing a way of life that was dramatically changing as a result of
mechanical innovation. The horse was an absolute necessity on English farms
at the beginning of the 20th century. In 1914 there were 25 million horses in
the United Kingdom, but by 1940 that number was reduced to 5 million with

211. SCRIBES, supra note 192, at 16–17.
212. Jenny Johnston, James Herriot’s Private Hell: The Shocking Truth About the Man Behind
TV’s Most Famous Vet, DAILY MAIL (Sept. 24, 2010 5:30 PM),
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/femail/article-1314863/James-Herriots-private-hell-The-shocking-truthman-TVs-famous-vet.html#ixzz56ulqwKBm [https://perma.cc/8ZH7-EAT4] (note that the shocking
truth is that White had depression).
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only 600,000 horses located on farms.213 One author noted, “The end of the
horse was bewilderingly swift.”214 The tractor replaced the horse on the small
farms throughout England, but the stories of those Yorkshire Dale farmers did
not end with the arrival of the tractor. When the Yorkshire Dales farmers
changed from horsepower to mechanical power, increased productivity and
larger farms was not the only result. Those farmers became excellent
mechanics. Many were tempted to ignore the march of technology, but in the
end almost all were forced to adapt to survive.
Lawyers, too, will need to adapt to survive.215 One current adaptation we
are facing is AI. Like the Yorkshire Dale farmers in the 1930s and 1940s,
lawyers who learn to work with the emerging technology can be both
innovative and traditional.216 The innovative piece will be the opportunity to
see the value and good in AI coupled with a willingness to learn as much as we
can about it. The traditional piece will be our continued commitment to the
value of creativity and empathy that lawyers, as human beings, bring to our
profession.

213. JOHN LEWIS-STEMPEL, YOUNG JAMES HERRIOT: THE MAKING OF THE WORLD’S MOST
FAMOUS VET 114 (2011).
214. Id.
215. Dennis Garcia and James Dempsey gave a presentation to the Seventh Circuit Bar
Association on May 6, 2019 in Milwaukee. In his remarks, Mr. Garcia advised attorneys and judges
not to “fear AI or change. Technology can be a lawyer’s best friend.” Dennis Garcia & James
Dempsey, Address at the 68th Annual Meeting of the Seventh Circuit Bar Association and Judicial
Conference of the Seventh Circuit: Artificial Intelligence: Implications for Judges, Lawyers, and the
Legal Profession (May 6, 2019). He also noted that “AI gives lawyers more time to do mission
critical work.” Id.
216. Dennis Garcia echoed this sentiment, saying that “we are all still at the early stages of AI,
and we should use a growth mindset.” Id. To that end, Mr. Garcia recommended that law schools
develop courses in law and AI.

